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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have proven to be quite eective
in a vast array of machine learning tasks, with recent examples in
cyber security and autonomous vehicles. Despite the superior per-
formance of DNNs in these applications, it has been recently shown
that these models are susceptible to a particular type of aack that
exploits a fundamental aw in their design. is aack consists of
generating particular synthetic examples referred to as adversarial
samples. ese samples are constructed by slightly manipulating
real data-points in order to “fool” the original DNN model, forcing
it to mis-classify previously correctly classied samples with high
condence. Addressing this aw in the model is essential if DNNs
are to be used in critical applications such as those in cyber security.
Previous work has provided various learning algorithms to en-
hance the robustness of DNN models, and they all fall into the
tactic of “security through obscurity”. is means security can be
guaranteed only if one can obscure the learning algorithms from ad-
versaries. Once the learning technique is disclosed, DNNs protected
by these defense mechanisms are still susceptible to adversarial
samples. In this work, we investigate this issue shared across pre-
vious research work and propose a generic approach to escalate
a DNN’s resistance to adversarial samples. More specically, our
approach integrates a data transformation module with a DNN,
making it robust even if we reveal the underlying learning algo-
rithm. To demonstrate the generality of our proposed approach and
its potential for handling cyber security applications, we evaluate
our method and several other existing solutions on datasets publicly
available, such as a large scale malware dataset, MNIST and IMDB
datasets. Our results indicate that our approach typically provides
superior classication performance and resistance in comparison
with state-of-art solutions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Beyond highly publicized victories in automatic game-playing as
in Go [34], there have been many successful applications of deep
neural networks (DNN) in image and speech recognition. Recent
explorations and applications include those in medical imaging [1,
38] and self-driving cars [11, 14]. In the domain of cybersecurity,
security companies have demonstrated that deep learning could
oer a far beer way to classify all types of malware [8, 30, 39].
Despite its potential, deep neural networks (DNN), like all other
machine learning approaches, are vulnerable to what is known
as adversarial samples [2, 18]. is means that they can be eas-
ily deceived by non-obvious and potentially dangerous manipula-
tion [26, 35]. To be more specic, an aacker could use the same
training algorithm, back-propagation of errors, and a surrogate
dataset to construct an auxiliary model. Since this model could
provide the aacker with a capability of exploring a DNN’s blind
spots, he can, with minimal eort, cra an adversarial sample – a
synthetic example generated by slightly modifying a real example
in order to make the deep learning system “believe” the sample
subtly perturbed belongs to an incorrect class with high condence.
According to a recent study [12], adversarial samples occur in a
subspace relatively broad, which means it is impractical to build a
defense that can rule out all adversarial samples. As such, the design
principle followed by existing defense mechanisms is not to harden
a DNNmodel naturally resistant to any adversarial samples. Rather,
they focus on hiding that subspace, making adversaries dicult in
nding impactful adversarial samples. For example, representative
defenses – adversarial training [12] and defensive distillation [29]
both increase the complexity of original DNNs with the goal of
making adversarial samples – impactful for original DNNs – no
longer eective.
However, in this work, we show that the defenses proposed
are far from ideal and even considered a dangerous practice. In
particular, we demonstrate existing defense mechanisms all follow
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the approach of “security through obscurity”, in which security is
achieved by keeping defenses obscured from adversaries. Frankly
speaking, defenses following this approach indeed mitigate the
adversarial sample problem. However, when applied to security
critical applications such as malware classication, they become
particularly disconcerting.
In the past, there have been a huge amount of debates on security
through obscurity, and a general consensus has been reach. at
is, obscurity is a perfectly valid security tactic but it cannot be
trusted for security. Once design or implementation is uncovered,
users totally lost all the security gained by obscurity. To regain the
security through obscurity, one has to come up with a completely
new design or implementation. As such, Kerckhos’ principle [19]
suggests obscurity can be used as a layer of defense, but it should
never be used as the only layer of defense.
Inspired by this, we propose a new mechanism to escalate a
DNN’s resistance to adversarial samples. Dierent from existing
defenses, our proposed approach unnecessitates model obscurity.
In other words, even though we reveal the model, it will still be
more than burdensome for adversaries to cra adversarial samples.
More specically, we arm a standard DNN with a data trans-
formation module, which projects original data input into a new
representation before they are passed through the consecutive DNN.
is can be used as a defense for the following two reasons. First,
data transformation can potentially stash away the space of ad-
versarial manipulations to a carefully designed hyperspace. is
makes aackers dicult in nding adversarial samples impact-
ful for the armed DNN. Second, as we will theoretically prove in
Section 4, a data transformation module carefully designed can
exponentially increase computation complexity for an aacker to
cra impactful adversarial samples. is means that, even though
an aacker compromises obscurity and has the full knowledge
about the armed DNN model (i.e., the training algorithm, dataset
and hyper-parameters), he still cannot launch the aack – detri-
mental to DNNs enhanced by other adversary-resistant techniques
– nor jeopardize model resistance.
e approach proposed in this work is benecial for the follow-
ing reasons. First, it escalates a DNN’s resistance to adversarial
samples with beer security assurance. Second, our approach en-
sures that a DNN maintains desirable classication performance
while requiring only minimal modication to existing architectures.
ird, while this work is primarily motivated by the need to safe-
guard DNN models used in critical security applications, it should
be noted that the proposed technique is general and can be adopted
to other applications where deep learning is popularly applied, such
as image recognition and sentiment analysis. We demonstrate this
applicability using publicly-available datasets in Section 5.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions.
• We propose a generic approach to facilitate the develop-
ment of adversary-resistant DNNs without following the
tactic of security through obscurity.
• Using our approach, we develop an adversary-resistant
DNN, and theoretically prove its resistance cannot be jeop-
ardized even if the model is fully disclosed.
• We evaluate the classication performance and robustness
of our adversary-resistant DNN and compare it with that
...
...
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Figure 1: A feed-forward deep neural network with three
hidden layers and a somax output layer.
of existing defense mechanisms. Our result shows that our
DNN exhibits similar – sometimes even beer – classica-
tion performance but with superior model resistance.
e rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the background of DNNs and adversarial sample problem. Section 3
discusses existing defense mechanisms and denes the problem
scope of our research. Section 4 presents our generic approach. In
Section 5, we develop and evaluate DNNs in the context of image
recognition, sentiment analysis and malware classication. Finally,
we conclude this work in Section 6.
2 BACKGROUND
A typical DNN architecture consists of multiple successive layers of
processing elements, or so-called “neurons”. Each processing layer
can be viewed as learning a dierent, more abstract representation
of the original multidimensional input distribution. As a whole, a
DNN can be viewed as a highly complex function, f (·) that is capa-
ble of nonlinearly mapping an original high-dimensional data point
to a lower dimensional output. In this section, we briey introduce
the well-established DNN model, followed by the description of the
adversarial learning problem.
2.1 Deep Neural Networks
As is graphically depicted in Figure 1, a DNN contains an input
layer, multiple hidden layers, and an output layer. e input layer
takes in each data sample in the form of a multidimensional vector.
Starting from the input, computing the pre-activations of each sub-
sequent layer simply requires, at minimum, a matrix multiplication
(where a weight/parameter vector, with length equal to the number
of hidden units in the target layer, is assigned to each unit of the
layer below) usually followed by summation with a bias vector. is
process roughly models the process of a layer of neurons integrat-
ing the information received from the layer below (i.e., computing
a pre-activation) before applying an elementwise activation func-
tion1. is integrate-then-re process is repeated subsequently for
1ere are many types of activations to choose from, including the hyperbolic tangent,
the logistic sigmoid, or the linear rectied function, etc. [4]
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each layer until the last layer is reached. e last layer, or out-
put, is generally interpreted as the model’s predictions for some
given input data, and is oen designed to compute a parameterized
likelihood distribution using the somax function (also known as
multi-class regression or minimizing cross entropy). is boom-
up propagation of information is also referred to as feed-forward
inference [15].
During the learning phase of the model, the DNN’s predictions
are evaluated by comparing them with known target labels associ-
ated with the training samples (also known as the“ground truth”).
Specically, both predictions and labels are taken as the input to L(·),
a selected cost function. e DNN’s parameters are then optimized
with respect to this cost function using the method of steepest
gradient descent, minimizing prediction errors on the training set.
More formally, given (X ,Y ): {(x1,y1), . . . , (xn ,yn )}, where xi ∈
Rm is a data sample and yi ∈ Rk is the corresponding data label,
where, if categorical, is typically represented through a 1-of-k en-
coding, the goal of model learning is to minimize the cost function
represented by
n∑
i=1
L(f (w ;xi );yi ), where f (w ;xi ) denotes the pre-
diction of training sample xi andw represents the weights and bias
associated with the connections between neurons.
2.2 Adversarial Sample Problem
An adversarial sample is a synthetic data sample craed by introduc-
ing slight perturbations to a legitimate input sample (see Figure 2).
In multi-class classication tasks, such adversarial samples can
cause a DNN to classify themselves into a random class other than
the correct one (sometimes not even a reasonable alternative). Re-
cent research [6] demonstrates that, aackers can uncover such
data samples through various approaches (e.g., [3, 12, 21, 28, 32, 35])
which can all be described as solving either optimization problem
xˆ = arдmax
xˆ
L(f (xˆ ;w);y)
s.t. ‖xˆ − x ‖p < ε,
(1)
or optimization problem
xˆ = arдmin
xˆ
L(f (xˆ ;w); yˆ)
s.t. ‖xˆ − x ‖p < ε
yˆ , y.
(2)
Here, optimization problem (1) indicates that an aacker searches
for adversarial sample xˆ , the prediction of which is as far as its
true label, whereas optimization problem (2) indicates an aacker
searches for adversarial sample xˆ so that its prediction is as close
as target label yˆ where yˆ is not equal to y, the true label of that
adversarial sample.
In both optimization problems above, L(·) represents the afore-
mentioned cost function and f (·) denotes the DNN model trained
with the traditional learning method discussed above . ‖·‖p is p-
norm – sometimes also specied as lp distance – indicating the
dissimilarity between adversarial sample xˆ and its corresponding
legit data sample x . With dierent values of p – most popularly se-
lected in adversarial learning research – the optimization problems
above can be computed in the following manners.
Legitimate samples
.
Adversarial samples generated by following [12]    
Adversarial samples generated by following [6]
Adversarial samples generated by following [35]
Figure 2: Legitimate samples and their corresponding adver-
sarial samples generated by following various approaches.
e adversarial samples are craed by introducing to the le-
gitimate samples pertubations nearly indistinguishable to
the human eyes.
(1) Withp = 2, p-norm represents the measure of Euclidean distance.
e constraint optimization problems above can be specied as
unconstrained optimization problems
xˆ = arдmax
xˆ
L(f (xˆ ;w);y) − c · ‖xˆ − x ‖2 (3)
and
xˆ = arдmin
xˆ
L(f (xˆ ;w); yˆ) + c · ‖xˆ − x ‖2 . (4)
Here, both (3) and (4) can be solved by following either a rst-
order optimization method (e.g., stochastic gradient descent [6]
and L-BFGS [35]) or a second-ordermethod (e.g., Newton-Raphson
method).
(2) With p = 0, p-norm indicates the number of elements in a legit
data sample that an aacker needs to manipulate in order to
turn it into an adversarial sample. Dierent from the computa-
tion method above, in the seing of p = 0 where unconstrained
optimization problems (3) and (4) are not dierentiable, the com-
putation for the optimal solution has to follow an approximation
method introduced in [28] or [6].
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(3) With p = ∞, p-norm becomes a measure indicating the maxi-
mum change to individual features. As such, the optimal so-
lution for (1) and (2) can be approximated by following the
fast gradient sign method [12], which computes perturbation
∂L(f (x ;w);y)/∂x (or ∂L(f (x ;w); yˆ)/∂x ), multiplies it by distor-
tion scale ε and then adds the product to legitimate data sample
x . Note that the way they compute that perturbation can be
through back-propagation in conjunction with gradient descent.
As is illustrated in the aforementioned optimization problems, in
order to generate impactful adversarial samples, an aacker needs
to know either standard DNN model f (·) or know of a way to
approximate f (·). A recent study [35] has revealed that an aacker
could well approximate a standard DNN model using a traditional
DNN training algorithm on an auxiliary training dataset. In this
paper, we use “cross-model approach” to refer to those adversarial
sample craing methods that rely upon the approximation of a
standard DNN model.
3 EXISTING DEFENSES AND PROBLEM
SCOPE
To counteract the adversarial learning problem described in the sec-
tion above, recent research invent various training algorithms [12,
13, 27, 35] to improve the robustness of a DNNmodel. ey indicate,
by using new training algorithms they design, one can improve a
DNN’s resistance to the adversarial samples craed through the
aforementioned cross-model approach. is is due to the fact that
their training algorithms smooth a standard DNN’s decision bound-
ary, making adversarial samples – impactful to standard DNN mod-
els – no longer suciently eective. In this section, we summarize
these defense mechanisms and discuss their limitations. Following
our summary and discussion, we also dene the problem scope of
our research.
3.1 Existing Defense Mechanisms
Recently, research in hardening deep learning mainly focuses on
two dierent tactics – data augmentation and model complexity
enhancement. Here, we summarize them in turn and disucss their
limitations.
Data augmentation. To resolve the issue of “blind spots” (a more
informal name given to adversarial samples), many methods that
could be considered as sophisticated forms of data augmentation2
have been proposed (e.g. [12, 13, 27]). In principle, these methods
expand their training set by combining known samples with poten-
tial blind spots, the process of which has been called adversarial
training [12]. Technically speaking, adversarial training can be for-
mally described as adding a regularization term known as DataGrad
to a DNN’s training loss function [27]. e regularization penalizes
the directions uncovered by adversarial perturbations (introduced
in Section 2.2). erefore, adversarial training can work to improve
the robustness of a standard DNN.
Model complexity enhancement. DNNmodels are already com-
plex, with respect to both the nonlinear function that they try to
2Data augmentation refers to articially expanding the data-set. In the case of images,
this can involve deformations and transformations, such as rotation and scaling, of
original samples to create new variants.
approximate as well as their layered composition of many param-
eters. However, the underlying architecture is straightforward
when it comes to facilitating the ow of information forwards and
backwards, greatly alleviating the eort in generating adversar-
ial samples. erefore, several ideas [13, 29] have been proposed
to enhance the complexity of DNN models, aiming to improve
the tolerance of complex DNN models with respect to adversarial
samples generated from simple DNN models. For example, [29]
developed a defensive distillation mechanism, which trains a DNN
from data samples that are “distilled” from another DNN. By using
the knowledge transferred from the other DNN, the learned DNN
classiers become less sensitive to adversarial samples. Similarly,
[13] proposed to stack an auto-encoder together with a standard
DNN. It shows that this auto-encoding enhancement increases a
DNN’s resistance to adversarial samples.
Limitation. While the aforementioned defenses have yielded
promising results in terms of increasing model resistance, the scope
of the model resistance they provide is relatively limited. Once
an aacker obtains the knowledge of the new training algorithms
– instead of using a traditional DNN training algorithm to substi-
tute the algorithm which the target DNN is trained with – he can
build his own model with the new training algorithm, and then
use it as the cross model to facilitate the craing of adversarial
samples. As we will show in Section 5, the adversarial samples
craed through such new cross models sustain their oensiveness
to the corresponding DNN models. is indicates that the eective-
ness of existing defense mechanisms is highly dependent upon the
obscurity of training algorithms.
3.2 Problem Scope
With the existing defenses and their limitation in mind, here we
dene the problem scope of our research.
Similar to most previous research – if not all – in hardening deep
learning, we assume that an aacker cras adversarial samples by
solving the aforementioned optimization problems with derivative
calculation (e.g., fast sign gradient descent or Newton-Raphson
method). We believe this assumption is realistic for the following
reason.
Derivative calculation is the most general approach for solving
an optimization problem. In the future, while one might be able
to derive new forms of approaches in solving the aforementioned
optimization problem, he or she has to ensure the new approaches
are computationally ecient. Without the aid from derivative
calculation, this can be relatively dicult. Even if one could com-
putationally eciently resolve the aforementioned optimization
problems – for example perhaps through relaxation – without de-
rivative calculation, he still need to prove the adversarial samples
derived from such an approach are impactful. Given that relaxation
reshapes an optimization problem, the “optimal” solution may not
even close to any local optima of that original optimization problem.
Dierent from prior research, we also assume that an adversary
has not only the access to a DNN’s structure as well as the dataset(s)
used to build the DNN but more importantly the algorithm used
to train the network. In other words, we assume a target DNN
model is no longer obscure to an adversary and rather he has the
full knowledge about a DNN model that he aempts to exploit. We
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Figure 3: A deep neural networkwith a data transformationmodule, projectingX , an input data sample, to new representation
д(X ) prior to passing it through the DNN, f (·).
believe this assumption is more practical because there is lile hope
of keeping an adversary-resistant training algorithm completely
secret from dedicated aackers. In the long run, any system the
security of which relies upon the obscurity of its design can be
doomed [19].
4 OUR APPROACH
To address the problem above, we propose a new approach to
harden DNN models. Technically speaking, it follows the tactic of
model complexity enhancement, which improves model resistance
by increasing model complexity. Dierent from the existing tech-
niques mentioned above, our approach however goes beyond the
scope of robustness they provide. It ensures that an aacker cannot
perform the aforementioned aack to generate adversarial samples
impactful to our learning model even if we reveal our training algo-
rithm. In other words, our approach escalate a DNN’s resistance to
adversarial samples without the requirement of obscuring training
algorithms.
As is discussed in the section above, the adversarial learning
problem can be viewed as an optimization problem. To resolve that
optimization problem, one needs to conduct analytical computation
of gradients with respect to an input data sample and perform
backward propagation accordingly. erefore, we escalate a DNN’s
robustness not only by increasing the model complexity but, more
importantly, restricting back-propagation.
More specically, we integrate to a DNN a data transformation
module, д(·) graphically indicated in Figure 3. As is illustrated in
the gure, the data transformation module projectsX , an input data
sample to д(X ), a new representation, before passing it through a
consecutive DNN. is transformation increases the complexity of
a DNN model and augments its resistance to adversarial samples
craed through the aforementioned cross-model scheme. In addi-
tion, it blocks the backward ows of gradients. With this block,
even if the underlying training algorithm is disclosed, an adversary
cannot cra adversarial samples. In the following, we specify the
design principle of our data transformation module, followed by its
design detail and some necessary discussions.
4.1 Design Principle
To block the backward ow of gradients, the design of data trans-
formation must satisfy three requirements. Most notably, the data
transformation must be non-dierentiable. As is discussed above,
craing adversarial samples requires the calculation of gradients
as well as the back-propagation of those gradients. By making
data transformation module д(·) non-dierentiable, therefore, we
can make gradient calculation intractable and thus obstruct the
backward ow of gradients. More formally, we can choose non-
dierentiable function д(x), making the derivative dicult to be
calculated, i.e.,
∂nL(f (д(xˆ);w);y)
∂xˆn
=
∂nL(f (д(xˆ);w);y)
∂д(xˆ)n ·
∂nд(xˆ)
∂xˆn
. (5)
Here, f (·) represents the DNN model in tandem with the data
transformationmodule, and L(·) denotes the cost function described
in Section 2.2. e derivative can be computed using either a rst-
order optimizationmethod (e.g., gradient descent) or a second-order
method (e.g., Newton-Raphson method), in which n is equal to 1
and 2, respectively.
While the non-dierentiability feature restricts the craing of
adversarial samples, an adversary might still be able to generate
adversarial samples. Since end-to-end gradient ow is blocked at
the input layer of the successive DNN, back-propagation can only
carry error gradients to the output of the transformation module.
Given д(·), an adversary could construct an adversarial sample by
inverting transformation module д(·) and passing the manipulated
transformation output through the inversion of the transformation.
More formally, the adversary can construct an adversarial sample
by computing
д−1(д(xˆ) + ∂
nL(f (д(xˆ);w);y)
∂д(xˆ)n ). (6)
In addition to making data transformation non-dierentiable, there-
fore, we must further ensure that the inversion of the data trans-
formation is computationally intractable. In other words, the data
transformation д(·) needs to have the property of non-invertibility.
Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA Q. Wang, W. Guo, K. Zhang, A. Ororbia II, X. Xing, L. Lin II, X. Liu II, and C. Lee Giles
Satisfying the two requirements above ensures that our proposed
approach can prohibit an aacker from craing adversarial sam-
ples directly from the target DNN model, and one does not need to
concern about the disclosure of training algorithms. However, the
data transformation proposed may signicantly jeopardize the ac-
curacy of a DNNmodel if not designed carefully. Take the following
extreme case for example.
Hash functions likeMD5 and SHA1 are one-way functions which
have the properties of non-dierentiability aswell as non-invertibility.
By simply using it as the transformation module, we can easily pro-
hibit an aacker from craing adversarial samples even if he knows
of which hash function we choose and how we integrate it with
DNNs. However, a hash function signicantly changes the distri-
bution of input data samples. Armed with it, a DNN model suers
from signicant loss in classication performance. Last but not
least, our design therefore must ensure data transformation can pre-
serve the distribution of data representation. is can potentially
make a DNN robust without sacricing classication performance.
4.2 Design Detail
Following the design principle above, we choose Locally Linear
Embedding (LLE) [31], a non-parametric dimensionality reduction
mechanism, serving as the data transformation module. As we will
discuss in the following, this representative non-parametric method
is non-dierentiable. More importantly, it can be theoretically
proven that inverting LLE is an NP-hard problem. Last but not
least, LLE seeks low-dimensional, neighborhood-preserving map
of high-dimensional input samples, and thus is a method that best
suited to preserving as much information in the input as possible.
In the following, we rst describe LLE and then expound upon the
fact that, as a non-parametric dimensionality reduction method,
LLE is non-dierentiable. Furthermore, we theoretically prove LLE
is computationally non-invertible.
4.2.1 Locally Linear Embedding. LLE is a non-parametricmethod
designed to reduce input data dimensionality and at the same time
preserve local properties of high-dimensional input in a lower-
dimensional space. To some extent, this can ensure the distribu-
tion of high-dimensional data samples is as close as they are in a
lower-dimensional space. Technically speaking, this is achieved
by representing each high-dimensional data sample via a linear
combination of its nearest neighbors. More formally, this can be
expressed as xi =
∑N
j=1wi j · x j . Here, xi and x j (xi ,x j ∈ R1×m )
denote the ith data sample and its jth neighbor (j = 1, 2...,N ), re-
spectively. wi j represents the weight, indicating the contribution
of x j to data sample xi . As is described in [31], those weights (a.k.a.
reconstruction weights) can be represented as weight matrixW
and computed by solving the following optimization problem:
min
W
∑
i
xi −∑
j
wi j · x j ‖22
s.t.
∑
j
wi j = 1.
(7)
In weight matrixW , LLE deemswi j = 0 if x j is not considered as a
neighbor of xi , and the total number of neighbors assigned to xi
is a carefully selected hyper-parameter. e neighboring relation
between xi and x j depends on the value of the l2 distance between
xi and x j .
Since the reconstruction weights encode the local properties of
the high-dimensional data, they can be used to preserve the data
distribution at the time of performing dimensionality reduction.
More specically, LLE imposes the corresponding reconstruction
weights to each lower-dimensional data sample via a similar lin-
ear combination, and then aempts to nd Y = {y1,y2, . . . ,yN },
the lower-dimensional representation of X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xN } by
solving the following optimization problem:
min
Y
∑
i
yi −∑
j
wi j · yj ‖22
s.t.
∑
i
yi = 0,
1
N
∑
i
yTi yi = I .
(8)
where yi ,yj ∈ R1×mc , indicating yi , yj consist ofmc of elements.
In order to solve the optimization problem above, the Rayleitz-
Ritz theorem [16] is typically used. It computes the eigenvectors
corresponding to the smallest nonzero eigenvalues of the inner
matrix product (I −W )T · (I −W ). For a detailed explication, we
refer the readers to [16]. Here, I ∈ RN×N is an identity matrix, and
W ∈ RN×N is the aforementioned reconstruction weight matrix.
LLE is specically designed to retain the similarity between pairs
of high dimensional samples when they are mapped to lower dimen-
sions [31]. To illustrate this property, we provide a visualization of
the data before and aer being processed by LLE in Figure 4. e
visualization result demonstrates that using LLE as a data trans-
formation module satises the last design principle discussed in
Section 4.1 (i.e., preserving the distribution of the original data).
More importantly, this property also helps bound the lower dimen-
sional mapping of adversarial samples to a vicinity which is lled
by mappings of original test samples that are highly similar to
these adversarial samples. As a result, there is a signicantly lower
chance that an adversarial sample acts as an outliers in the lower
dimensional space. In other words, LLE makes a DNN more resis-
tant to adversarial samples. In Section 5, we empirically validate
this important property.
4.2.2 Non-dierentiability of LLE. Existing dimensionality re-
duction methods can be categorized as either parametric or non-
parametric [36]. Parametric methods utilize a xed amount of
parameters to specify a direct mapping from high-dimensional data
samples to their low-dimensional projections (or vice versa). is
direct mapping is characterized by parameters, which are typically
optimized to provide the best mapping performance. is is simi-
lar to the functionality provided by a standard DNN, which maps
high-dimensional data samples to the nal decision space through
dierentiable function f (·). As such, the derivative of paramet-
ric methods typically can be computed in an analytically ecient
manner. In other words, parametric methods are generally dier-
entiable, and this nature becomes a disadvantage for blocking the
backward gradient ow.
On the contrary, non-parametric methods do not suer from the
issue above. For any non-parametric method, д(·), there is no way
to express it in a closed form. erefore, the derivative of д(·) can be
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(a) Before LLE processing. (b) Aer LLE processing.
Figure 4: Visualization of the MNIST data set [20] in a 2-dimensionality space before and aer proceeded by LLE.
computed only through a numeric but not an analytical approach.
More formally, this means the calculation of ∂д(x)/∂x needs to
be completed through the calculation of limit limh→0
д(x+h)−д(x )
h .
Given that a deep neural network takes as input each individual
sample, which is discrete in the sample space, it is dicult to dene
the continuity of д(·) with traditional topology and thus the dier-
entiability of д(·) cannot be guaranteed. is indicates, as a member
of non-parametric methods, LLE perfectly satises the rst design
principle discussed in Section 4.1 (i.e., not capable of performing
derivative calculation).
4.2.3 Non-invertibility of LLE. We validate the non-invertibility
of LLE by theoretically proving that reconstructing original high-
dimensional data from low-dimensional representations transformed
by LLE is computationally intractable. More formally, we prove
that, given a set of low-dimensional data Y = {y1,y2, . . . ,yN }
(Y ∈ RN×mc ) produced by LLE, reconstructing their original high-
dimensional representations X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xN } (X ∈ RN×m )
from Y is at least an NP-hard problem.
Recall that LLE computes weight matrixW and utilizes it to
project high-dimensional data samples to a lower-dimensional
space. As a result, to restore high-dimensional data from its lower-
dimensional representations, one has to recover that matrix by
following the calculation similar to that shown in (7), except that
xi and x j are replaced by yi and yj .
Once weight matrixW is restored, the recovery of original high-
dimensional data can be viewed as solving the following optimiza-
tion problem:
min
X
∑
i
xi −∑
j
wi j · x j
2
2. (9)
It is not dicult to realize that Equation (9) can be dened in the
following quadratic form:
min
X
∑
i, j
mi j · (xi · x j ), (10)
wheremi j = δi j −wi j −w ji +∑k wkiwk j . Note that δi j = 1 if i = j
and 0 otherwise. If expressingmi j as the following matrix:
M =
©­­­­«
m11 m12 · · · m1N
m21 m22 · · · m2N
...
...
. . .
...
mN 1 mN 2 · · · mNN
ª®®®®¬
, (11)
we can easily realize thatM is a symmetric matrix, which has the
property ofMT = M .
Now, with the analysis above, the validation of non-invertibility
amounts to proving that solving (10) is at least an NP-hard problem.
In this work, we conduct this proof by introducing several con-
straints to this equation. Our basic idea is to use these constraints
to relax the optimization problem in (10) to a nearby problem which
can be easily proved as an NP-hard problem. More specically, we
introduce the following constraints:∑
i
xi = ®0, (12)
and
− 1 ≤ xi j ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N , j ∈m, (13)
where ®0 denotes a zero vector, and xi j represents the jth element
in vector xi .
With these constraints introduced to Equation 10, we can re-
lax the optimization problem to a quadratic problem with a non-
positive semi-denite constraint, which itself is a class of NP-hard
problems [9]. In the following, we provide more details on why
the involvement of the aforementioned constraints transforms the
optimization problem in (10) to this class of NP-hard problems.
Let A ∈ RNA×1 denote a column vector which is the concate-
nation of xi for i = 1, . . . ,N and NA = N ×m. en, we have
A = (x1,x2, · · · ,xN )T. Let q ∈ R1×NA denote a row vector in
which every element is equal to 1. We further dene matrices
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P ,Q ∈ RNA×NA as follows:
P =
©­­­­«
P11 P12 · · · P1N
P21 P22 · · · P2N
...
...
...
PN 1 PN 2 · · · PNN
ª®®®®¬
, Q = −I , (14)
where Pi j = mi j · J . J ∈ Rm×m is a matrix of ones where every
element is equal to 1.
Given the constraint in (12) that we introduce, it is not dicult
to discover
∑
i x
T
i =
®0. Since the multiplication of a vector and its
transpose derives a non-negative value, we have ΣixixTi ≥ 0 and
the constraint in (12) can be expressed as inequation −ΣixixTi +∑
i x
T
i + α ≤ 0, indicating there exists a positive number, α that
always holds the inequity. By rewriting the inequation using the
notations newly dened above, we can therefore transform the
constraint in (12) into the form of ATQA + qA + α ≤ 0.
Given the constraint in (13), we can easily derive inequation
Σixix
T
i −NA ≤ 0, which can be further expressed as ΣixixTi −NA+
γ ≤ 0 indicating there alway exists a constant, γ that holds the
inequity. By rewriting both the constraint itself and this inequation
using newly dened notations, we can derive constraints ‖A‖∞ ≤
1 as well as ATIA − NA + γ ≤ 0. As such, we can transform
Equation (10) and the aforementioned constraints in (12) and (13)
into following form:
min ATPA
s.t. ATQA + qA + α ≤ 0.
ATIA − NA + γ ≤ 0.
‖A‖∞ ≤ 1.
(15)
Here, Q is negative semi-denite, and thus Equation (15) is a qua-
dratic problemwith a non-positive semi-denite constraint. Accord-
ing to [9, 37], Equation (15) belongs to a class of NP-hard problems,
which implies the non-invertability of LLE.
4.3 Discussion
Here, we discuss some related issues and possible aacks against
our proposed technique.
Approximation of LLE. While the aforementioned discussion
and theoretical proof have already indicated the eectiveness of
our proposed approach, intuition suggests that an adversary might
still come up with an aack. Specically, he might approximate
LLE using a parametric mapping and then substitute LLE accord-
ingly. Since parametric mappings do not have the property of
non-dierentiability, the adversary can take advantage of the sub-
stitute, pass gradients through and eventually cra adversarial
samples. However, as we will show in Section 5, even using the
state-of-the-art approximation scheme, an adversary cannot cra
impactful adversarial samples.
Other dimensionality reductionmethods. As is described above,
we choose LLE, a representative non-parametric dimensionality
reduction method, to serve as the data transformation module. is
is due to the fact that it provides many properties needed for hard-
ening a DNN, such as non-dierentiability, non-invertibility and
the capability of preserving data distribution.
Going beyond LLE, there are other non-parametric dimension-
ality reduction methods that oer the same properties, e.g., t-
Distributed Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE) [23] and Sam-
monMapping [33]. However, they cannot be utilized in our problem
domain for the following reason.
Deep neural networks exhibit superior performance when deal-
ingwith data in a relatively high dimensionality. Other non-parametric
methods are typically designedmore for tasks like visualization [23]
where it is required that the dimensionality of the mappings is two
or three. Using them as our data transformation module, they can-
not provide high-dimensional data input for the DNN in tandem
with the transformation, and may signicantly jeopardize classi-
cation performance.
5 EVALUATION
As is described in Section 1, adversarial training [12] and defensive
distillation [29] are the most representative techniques that have
been proposed to defend against adversarial samples. In this work,
we use the proposed approach to train our own adversary resistant
DNN (LLE-DNN), and then compare it with those enhanced by
these two approaches.
5.1 Dataset
We evaluate our adversary-resistant DNN model by performing
multiple experiments on several widely used datasets, including
a dataset for malware detection [5], the MNIST dataset for image
recognition [20] and the IMDB dataset for sentiment analysis [22].
Malware dataset: It is a collection of window audit logs, each of
which ties to either a benign or malicious soware sample. e
dimensionality of the feature-space for each sample is reduced to
10,000 based on the feature selection metric in [5]. Each feature
indicates the occurrence of either a single lesystem access or
a sequence of access events, thus taking on the value of 0 or 1.
Figure 2 illustrates a subset of features of a soware sample. Here, 0
indicates that the sequence of events did not occur while 1 indicates
the opposite. For each soware sample, it has been labeled with
either 1 or 0, indicating malicious and benign soware, respectively.
e dataset is split into 26,078 training examples, with 14,399 benign
and 11,679 malicious soware samples, and 6,000 testing samples,
with benign and malicious soware samples evenly divided.
MNIST dataset: It is a large database of handwrien digits that is
commonly used for training various image processing systems. It
is composed of 70,000 greyscale images (of 28×28, or 784, pixels) of
handwrien digits, split into a training set of 60,000 samples and a
testing set of 10,000 samples.
IMDB dataset: It consists of 25,000 movie reviews, with one half
labeled as “positive” and the other “negative”, indicating the sen-
timent of these reviews. We randomly split the dataset with 70%
movie reviews for training and the remaining for testing. Following
the procedure introduced in [24], we encoded the words in each
movie review using a dictionary carrying 5,000 words most fre-
quently used. en, we utilized a word embedding technique [24]
to convert each word into a vector with a dimensionality of 600.
For each movie review, we linearly combined the vectors indicating
the words appearing in that review, and then treat the embedding
as the representation of that movie review.
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Learning
Technology
Black Box White Box
MNIST MALWARE IMDB MNIST MALWARE IMDB
l∞ l2 l0 l0 l∞ l2 l∞ l2 l0 l0 l∞ l2
Standard DNN 6.86% 6.40% 7.50% 26.19% 28.10% 29.56% 6.86% 6.40% 7.50% 26.19% 28.10% 29.56%
Distillation 87.06% 96.22% 47.36% 79.93% 82.65% 87.31% 34.43% 12.60% 8.43% 40.47% 48.98% 49.12%
Adv. Training 89.09% 96.23% 84.33% 96.70% 87.43% 87.66% 33.94% 14.44% 8.89% 43.09% 50.78% 51.0%
LLE-DNN 95.25% 96.59% 86.12% 95.02% 87.58% 87.69% 97.02% 97.45% 87.49% 94.66% 87.47% 87.53%
Table 1: e comparison of model resistance to adversarial samples craed in dierent manners. e values in the table
represent the classication accuracy that DNN models exhibit when classifying adversarial samples.
(a) Legitimate movie review. (b) Adversarial movie review.
Figure 5: A legitimate movie review and its adversarial sample. Note that the replacement words are highlighted.
Feature Examples
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\slc.dll
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\cryptsp.dll
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\slc.dll,
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\cryptsp.dll
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\wersvc.dll,
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\faultrep.dll
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\imm32.dll,
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\wer.dll
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\ntmarta.dll,
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[system]\apphelp.dll
WINDOWS FILE:Execute:[fonts]\times.f
Table 2: An illustration of features in malware dataset. In-
dividual features are represented in rows. ey are either a
lesystem access or a sequence of lesystem events.
5.2 Experimental Design
For each application described above, we train 4 DNN models using
the traditional deep learning training method, adversarial train-
ing [12], defensive distillation [29] and our own approach. We
specify the hyperparameters of these DNNs in Table 3. We mea-
sure their classication accuracy by applying the models to the
corresponding testing datasets. By comparing their classication
performance, we evaluate the inuence that our proposed approach
brings to a DNN.More specically, we examine if LLE-DNN exhibits
similar – if not the same or beer – classication accuracy.
Since the goal of this work is to improve the robustness of a DNN
model, we also evaluate our DNN models’ resistance to adversarial
samples. In particular, we derive adversarial samples from the
aforementioned testing datasets, test them against our DNN model
and compare its model resistance with those of DNNs enhanced by
the other two techniques [12, 29].
As is discussed in Section 2.2, an aacker cras adversarial sam-
ples through auxiliary models. In Table 1, black-box and white-box
indicate the auxiliary models trained through dierent schemes.
More specically, black-box represents the auxiliary model trained
through the standard deep learning training scheme, indicating an
aacker does not have sucient knowledge about the underlying
training algorithm and he can use only a standard approach to train
a cross model and cra adversarial samples. White-box represents
the auxiliary model trained exactly through the learning schemes
proposed as a defense. is simulates a situation where a defense
mechanism is publicly disclosed and an aacker exploits that mech-
anism to produce a highly similar – if not the same – model to cra
adversarial samples. Note that, for both black-box and white-box
tactics, we use the same hyperparameters and training dataset to
build auxiliary models. More specically, our auxiliary model train-
ing shares the same hyperparameters and training dataset with the
standard DNN shown in Table 3.
In addition to the methods described in Section 2.2, the craing
of adversarial samples must ensure a slight perturbation introduced
to a data sample does not undermine its semantic. In other words,
we must make sure that, while misleading a classier to output the
wrong class with high condence, the perturbation to an image
should be nearly indistinguishable to the human eyes, that to a
malicious soware sample should not jeopardize soware function-
ality nor break its malevolence, and that to a movie review should
not break its semantic meaning. In the following, we describe how
we ne-tune adversarial samples to preserve semantic for dierent
applications.
Malware classication. Recall that our malware samples are rep-
resented by features, the value of which are binary, indicating the
occurrence of an lesystem access or a sequence of access events.
When generating adversarial samples, we cannot simply disable
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Hyper ParametersTraining
Algorithms Datasets DNN Structure Activation Optimizer Learning Rate Dropout Batch Epoch
MNIST 784-500-300-100 Sigmoid Adam 0.001 - 100 70
Malware 3738-3000-1000-100-2 Relu Adam 0.001 0.25 500 20StandardDNN IMDB 600-200-200-100-2 Tanh Adam 0.001 0.5 100 40
MNIST 784-100-100-100-10 Tanh SGD 0.1 0.25 100 60
Malware 3738-3000-1000-100-2 Relu Adam 0.001 0.25 500 20AdversarialTraining IMDB 600-300-100-50-2 Sigmoid Adam 0.001 0.2 100 100
MNIST 784-200-50-20-10 Tanh SGD 0.1 0.25 100 100
Malware 3738-3000-100-20-2 Relu SGD 0.1 0.25 100 20Distillation(T=20) IMDB 600-100-100-50-2 Sigmoid SGD 0.1 0.2 100 50
MNIST 200-200-100-10 Relu Adam 0.001 0.5 100 50
Malware 1000-500-200-100-2 Relu Adam 0.001 0.5 100 50LLE-DNN
IMDB 500-300-200-100-2 Tanh Adam 0.001 0.5 100 100
Table 3: e hyperparameters of all the investigated DNN models.
lesystem access events in that this might jeopardize the function-
ality of the soware sample and even break down its malevolence.
With this in mind, a bit of care must be taken.
In this work, our experiment follows the approach introduced
in Section 2.2. To be specic, we cra adversarial soware sam-
ples by solving optimization problem (1) with the seing of zero
norm (i.e., l0). is indicates the manipulation to a sample is re-
stricted to ipping binary feature values. In addition, this implies
the strongest aack scenario in that optimization problem (1) car-
ries less constraints making the adversarial samples chosen for our
evaluation more impactful. Going beyond adversarial sample cra-
ing approach discussed in Section 2.2, we also restrict that the value
change of a feature can be only from 0 to 1 but not the opposite.
is amounts to allowing the addition of new lesystem access
events only. is manipulation strategy is reasonable for the reason
that malware mutation techniques (e.g., [25]) can morph a malware
sample by stitching together instructions from benign programs,
making the malware perform additional lesystem accesses but not
undermining its maliciousness nor its functionality. Since malware
manipulation is done with the intent of fooling a malware classier
driven by a DNN, it should be noticed that we do not morph a
benign soware sample, making it malicious.
Image recognition. Image data samples contain less strict se-
mantic than the malware data samples above. To preserve image
semantic – making a perturbation nearly indistinguishable – we fol-
low the approaches introduced in [6, 12, 35]. More specically, we
selected l0, l2 and l∞ distance to represent the dissimilarity between
an image and its corresponding adversarial sample. Especially, we
restrict the l∞ distance in a relative small range (i.e., ϵ ≤ 0.15) when
craing adversarial samples.
Sentiment Analysis. To generate adversarial samples for movie
reviews, we again followed the approach introduced in Section 2.2.
To be specic, we solved optimization problem (1) and congured
p-norm with the seing to l2 and l∞. is is due to the fact that
each review is encoded in a vector in which each element is a
decimal, and l2 and l∞ distances represent the best measure for
the dissimilarity between a movie review and its corresponding
adversarial sample.
Learning technology AccuracyMNIST MALWARE IMDB
Standard DNN 98.45% 92.97% 87.89%
Distillation 98.46% 92.45% 87.36%
Adv. training 98.77% 91.48% 87.67%
LLE-DNN 98.19% 93.56% 87.79%
Table 4: e comparison of classication accuracy on dier-
ent datasets.
As is mentioned above, each vocabulary has been encoded in
a vector with a dimensionality of 600, and we embedded a movie
review by linearly combining corresponding vectors. When gener-
ating an adversarial sample by introducing a slight perturbation to
the embedding, we cast the perturbation to only one vector. is
ensures that we introduce only one word change to that review
with the hope that it preserves the semantic meaning of that review
as much as possible. However, one word change does not guaran-
tee the invariance of the semantic meaning. For example, it would
be obvious alteration to the semantic meaning if the replacement
happens to be the negative word in “… makes it the biggest disap-
pointment I’ve experienced from cinema in years …”. As such, we
manually choose the word that incurs minimal semantic change
to that movie review. Figure 5 illustrates a movie review sample
and its corresponding adversarial sample generated through this
approach.
5.3 Experimental Setup and Results
On the datasets described above, we rst measure the accuracy of
all the aforementioned defense techniques. We then measure their
resistance to the adversarial samples craed through the aforemen-
tioned tactics.
5.3.1 Classification Accuracy. To identify the optimal dimen-
sionality to which LLE needs to map original data samples, we
implemented several LLE-DNNs with dierent seings of dimen-
sionality of LLE mappings. Figure 6 shows the impact of dimen-
sionality mapping upon the classication accuracy obtained by
Building Adversary-Resistant Deep Neural Networks without Security through ObscurityConference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
(a) MNIST. (b) Malware. (c) IMDB.
Figure 6: e variation of classication accuracy vs. the dimensionality of data mappings.
LLE-DNN. Across all three datasets, it is easy to observe that, the
classication accuracy rst increases when the dimensionality of
the LLE mappings rises and then starts to decrease. In our experi-
ment, we choose the highest classication accuracy to represent
the performance of our LLE-DNN.
Table 4 presents the classication accuracy results obtained from
all investigated DNNs with respect to the testing datasets. Note
that, while prior works (e.g, [7, 10]) have already demonstrated
they can train a DNN with an error rate less than 1% on the MNIST
benchmark, their performance improvement does not result from a
DNN but model ensemble or elastic distortions added to training
data. To study the inuence of our proposed approach upon a stan-
dard DNN, therefore, we did not combine models nor augment with
articially distorted versions of the original training samples. e
classication accuracy shown in the table has already represented
the best performance that a standard DNN can achieve.
Similar to adversarial training and defensive distillation, the
LLE-DNN is quite eective in preserving classication accuracy.
is implies our proposed approach well preserves data sample
distribution. For the malware classication task, it can be observed
that LLE-DNN appears to be beer at feature learning, achieving the
highest classication accuracy among DNNs that we investigated.
is is presumably due to the fact that malware data samples are
highly sparse carrying a large amount of redundant information,
and the data transformation module in LLE-DNN eliminates those
redundancy and ameliorates the learning ability of a DNN.
5.3.2 Model Resistance. Table 1 illustrates the DNNs that we
investigated as well as their accuracy in classifying adversarial sam-
ples. It can be observed that, black-box adversarial samples can cut
down the accuracy of the standard DNN to 6.86%, 6.40% and 7.50%
under the aacks of l∞, l2 and l0, respectively. In contrast, all of the
defense mechanisms investigated demonstrate strong resistance
to these black-box adversarial samples. is indicates, without
sucient knowledge on the underlying defense mechanisms, it is
dicult for an aacker to cra impactful adversarial samples. In
other words, existing defense mechanisms can signicantly escalate
a DNN’s resistance to adversarial samples if one can obscure the
design of the defenses.
Despite the improvement in model robustness, we also observe
that our LLE-DNN generally exhibits the best resistance to black-
box adversarial samples, whereas the defensive distillation ap-
proach typically yields the worst resistance. is is presumably due
to the fact that, the dimensionality reduction resided in LLE-DNN
transforms adversarial samples into a subspace in which they no
longer act as outliers, while defensive distillation smooths only
a classication decision boundary which does not signicantly
reduce the subspace of adversarial samples.
With regard to the white-box seing, we discover both adversar-
ial training and defensive distillation suer from white-box adver-
sarial samples. eir resistance to white-box adversarial samples is
signicantly worse than those created under the black-box seing.
is observation is consistent with that reported in [6]. e reason
behind this is that, both techniques stash away the adversarial sam-
ple subspace, but the disclosure of defense mechanisms uncovers
the path of nding that subspace.
Dierent from adversarial training and defensive distillation, our
LLE-DNN is naturally resistant to white-box adversarial samples.
As is discussed in Section 4, our proposed approach stashes away
the adversarial sample subspace and at the same time restricts
derivative calculation. Even if our defense mechanism is revealed,
therefore, it is still computationally dicult to nd adversarial
samples.
To perform quantitative comparison with the other two ap-
proaches, however, we approximate the data transformation in
the LLE-DNN – non-parametric dimensionality reduction com-
ponent – using a parametric model. To be specic, we choose a
DNN to approximate LLE in that a DNN has a large amount of
parameters which is typically viewed as the best approximation for
non-parametric learning models [17]. With the support from this
approximation, we treated the LLE-DNN as a white box and gener-
ated adversarial samples accordingly. We show its model resistance
in Table 1. It can be observed that, our LLE-DNN still demonstrates
strong resistance to white-box adversarial samples even if we sub-
stituted LLE to its best approximation. is implies that, there
might a theoretical lower bound between a non-parametric model
and its parametric approximation, which can naturally serve as a
defense against white-box adversarial samples.
6 CONCLUSION
A Deep Neural Network is vulnerable to adversarial samples. Ex-
isting defense mechanisms improve a DNN model’s resistance to
adversarial samples by using the tactic of security through obscu-
rity. Once the design of the defense is disclosed, therefore, the
robustness they provide wane. Motivated by this, this work intro-
duces a new approach to escalate the robustness of a DNN model.
In particular, it integrates to a DNN model LLE, a non-parametric
dimensionality reduction method. With this approach, we show
that one can develop a DNN model resistant to adversarial sam-
ples even if he or she reveals its design details (i.e., the underlying
training algorithm). By demonstrating the DNNs enhanced by our
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proposed technique across various applications, we argue the pro-
posed approach introduces nearly no degradation in classication
performance. In contrast, for some applications, it even exhibits
performance improvement. As part of the future work, we will
further explore the performance of this approach in a wider variety
of applications across dierent deep neural architectures.
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